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MICROBES, SIMULATORS, AND SATELLITES: THE
PRUDENT OPERATOR PURSUES ENHANCED
RECOVERY UNDER THE IMPLIED COVENANTS
OWEN M. LOPEZ* AND WILLIAM CLINT PARSLEY* *
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of this century, the oil and gas industry in the
United States has had as its "prime mover"' the well-known figure
of the prudent operator. In 1905 in the case of Brewster v. Lanyon
Zinc Co., 2 then Judge Van Devanter of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit enunciated the durable standard governing
performance in the industry, which to this day, remarkably, still
holds sway: "Whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably
expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the
interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required." 3 This
standard is to oil and gas law what that venerable fellow, the
reasonable man, is to the law of torts.4 Despite the remarkable
changes in the industry over the decades, the prudent operator has
*B.A., 1963, Stanford University; J.D., 1968, Notre Dame Law School; Hinkle, Cox, Eaton,
Coffield & Hensley, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
* *B.A., 1975, University of Texas;J.D., 1979, Georgetown University Law Center; Attorney
at Law, Austin, Texas; Member of the Bars of the States of Texas and New Mexico.
1. In oil field slang "prime mover" is the chief source of power on a drilling rig.
2. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
3. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
4. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 806.3, at 40-42 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. Williams and Meyers offer the following definition of a prudent operator:
"He is a hypothetical oil operator who does what he ought to do and does not do what he ought not to
do with respect to operations on the leasehold." Id. at 41.
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persisted to the present, although not without recent criticism. 5
In our estimation, the standard has served the lessors, lessees,
their advocates, and the courts well, and if the present is sage for
the future, will continue to do so. The purpose of this Article is,
first, to examine the prudent operator's performance in three
recent cases6 concerning the implied covenants of development,
diligent operations, protection, and exploration7 as they pertain to
enhanced recovery;' second, to examine various current industry
efforts at enhanced recovery and, to a lesser extent, modern
exploratory methods; and finally, to tentatively draw conclusions
and formulate predictions about past industry performance and
future directions.
II. THE IMPLIED COVENANTS OF DEVELOPMENT,
DILIGENT OPERATIONS, AND PROTECTION
The implied covenant of development has traditionally
involved a duty to diligently drill additional wells under an oil and
gas lease that is held by production in paying quantities. 9 The
5. See Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral
Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL& GAS L. & TAX'N 177, 177-78, 212-13 (1976); Williams, Implied Covenants in
Oil and Gas Leases: Some General Principles, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1981); 40 LA. L. REV.
974, 985 (1980).
6. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979); Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
7. In 1956 Professor Charles J. Meyers suggested an implied covenant of further exploration,
which required exploratory activities by the operator upon a leasehold held by production obtained
in the primary term of the oil and gas lease. See Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34
TEX. L. REv. 553 (1956). The covenant of further exploration has been discussed, challenged, and
defended in a notable display of rhetoric and conceptual acuity. See, e.g., 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 4, §§ 841-847 (note especially the articles cited at pp. 261-62 n.6); Pickerill, Is There a New
Implied Covenant of Explorvelopment?, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 245 (1980).
8. Enhanced recovery has been defined as "any method used to recover more oil from a
petroleum reservoir than would be obtained by primary recovery." NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL,
ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 3 (1976). The term "enhanced recovery" is used herein in a broader
context to mean any reasonable method a prudent operator would employ to maximize the recovery
of oil and gas under his leasehold consistent with an economic application of advancing technology.
Thus, enhanced recovery includes not only secondary or tertiary recovery, but also the most modern
prudent use of equipment and technique in the primary recovery phases, infill drilling, fieldwide
administrative relief in the form of pressure maintenance or an adjustment of allowables, unitization
before fully developing the common source of supply, and application of secondary and tertiary
recovery techniques before the primary energy drive is depleted.
Enhanced recovery includes, in an even broader sense, the use of reasonable exploratory
methods by a prudent operator to maximize the discovery of reserves in an area of exploratory
operations. This would include the use of reciprocal exploration agreements and the disciplines of
economics and decision analysis, in addition to the use of advancing exploratory technology. See
generally R. MEGILL, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXPLORATION ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1979); P. NEWENDORP,
DECISION ANALYSIS FOR PETROLEUM EXPLORATION (1975); Williams, Implied Covenants for Development
and Exploration in Oil and Gas Leases - The Determination of Profitability, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 443 (1979);
Williams, supra note 5.
9. Different formulations of the covenant of development have been posited. See, e.g., 5 E.
KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 58.1, at 58 (1978) (duty to maintain active
interest in developing the lease, in determining whether further development is feasible, and in
drilling further development wells if drilling is feasible); M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES 23-25 (2d ed. 1940) (implied covenant to drill additional wells); 2 W. SUMMERS, THE
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covenant to carry on operations with due diligence has been
described as a "catchall" obligation concerning situations not
covered by the other more specific implied covenants. It reiterates
the duty of the lessee to act in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the lease. 10 The covenant to protect the leasehold from
drainage requires the drilling of offset wells when the lessor
establishes that substantial drainage has occurred and that an offset
well would produce oil and gas in commercial quantities. 1 Our
concern is with these covenants as recently applied to a lessee's
duties in carrying out enhanced recovery activities, including
engaging in secondary recovery 12 and operating in the context of
fieldwide development.
A. SECONDARY RECOVERY
In 1979 the Louisiana Court of Appeals decided the case of
Waseco Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp. 13 The decision
involved an action by Waseco to cancel an eighty acre oil and gas
lease held by the lessee-operator, Bayou State, in the Bellevue
Field, Bossier Parish, Louisiana. 14  The field was initially
discovered in 1921, and by the time Bayou State acquired the lease,
known as the Scanland lease, in 1953, production was reaching the
end of its primary phase. 15 The appellate court affirmed the lower
court's judgment cancelling the lease for failure to diligently
develop the premises as a reasonably prudent operator. 16
When Bayou State acquired the lease, approximately 50 wells
had been drilled to the Nacatoch Sand at a depth of 350-500 feet
below the surface. The average leasehold production in 1955 was
about 46 barrels of oil per day. Between 1953 and 1976 Bayou State
expended no capital on the lease by drilling additional wells,
reworking existing wells, or otherwise. By 1976 production had
declined to six barrels per day from the only nine wells producing
on the leasehold. 17
LAW OF OIL AND GAS S 395, at 535 (1959) (a covenant, if oil or gas be found in paying quantities, to
proceed with reasonable diligence in drilling a sufficient number of wells to reasonably develop the
premises).
10. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 861, at 424.
11. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, §5 822-832, at 78-80.
12. Secondary recovery is defined broadly as "methods of oil extraction in which energy sources
extrinsic to the reservoir are utilized in the extraction." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
TERMS 681-82 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS].
13. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979). For analyses of the
Waseco case, see 40 LA. L. REV. 974 (1980) and 15 TULSA L..J. 597 (1980).
14. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil, 371 So. 2d 305, 306, 310 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979).
15. 371 So. 2d at 310-11.
16. Id. at 306, 313.
17. Id. at 310-11.
503
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The court found that the extensive drilling and testing
activities of the operators in the field had resulted in a clear
understanding of its subsurface strata, including the quality and
thickness of the Nacatoch Sand, its heavy, viscous oil, and its lack
of reservoir pressure and amenability to waterflooding. The
Scanland property was comparable to other adjoining properties in
the field and contained an estimated 3,000,000 barrels of additional
recoverable oil. 18
The evidence before the court further showed that Getty, a
major operator in the field, had begun a fireflood project19 in 1963,
had drilled more than 500 wells on its leases and planned to drill
200 more, had produced from one of its 40 acre leases more than
2,000,000 barrels of oil, and had produced more than 2,500,000
barrels of oil from an 80 to 90 acre lease which had been fireflooded
since 1967.20 Getty's pilot fireflood program on a mere 2.8 acres
had increased production within an 18 month period from 4 barrels
to 100 barrels per day. 21 Another major operator, Cities Service,
had drilled hundreds of wells since it commenced its fireflood
operations in 1971. Even Bayou State had initiated a fireflood
program on another of its leases, the Wyche lease, but had not
carried on active development operations since 1975.22
Finally, the court found that the Bellevue fireflood projects had
been well publicized, that the knowledge of Getty's increased
production was available to Bayou State, and that fireflooding
would successfully produce sixty percent of the oil in place
compared to the stripper method's recovery of five percent. 23 In
fact, several years before the filing of the lawsuit, Waseco had
requested that Bayou State initiate a fireflood project to further
develop the lease, but Bayou State refused to undertake any
feasibility studies or plans for fireflooding the lease.
2 4
18. Id. at 311.
19. Fireflooding is also called in-situ combustion and is defined as follows:
An experimental means of recovery of oil of low gravity and high viscosity which
is unrecoverable by other methods. The essence of the method is to heat the oil in the
horizon to increase its mobility by decreasing its viscosity. Heat is applied by igniting
the oil sand and keeping the fire alive by the injection of air. The heat breaks the oil
down into coke and lighter oils and the coke catches fire, As the combustion front
advances, the lighter oils move ahead of the fire into the bore of a producing well.
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 365. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text for
a discussion offireflooding and other thermal processes.
20. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil, 371 So. 2d at 311.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 312.
23. Id. at 311-12. The court of appeals noted that while fireflooding is a technique of secondary
recovery, it is the only efficient method of producing the type of residual oil in the Bellevue Field. Id.
at 312.
24. Id. at 312-13.
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For more than thirty years commentators have recognized that
in an oil and gas lease there exists an obligation to employ
secondary recovery methods for the extraction of hydrocarbons if it
is reasonably prudent to do so. In 1951 the preeminent Professor
Merrill stated:
To the extent that secondary recovery methods are
capable of application to a leased tract as an independent
unit, the implied covenant obligations seem to present no
serious obstacle to their adoption. In fact, since they
afford a means of increasing the return to the lessor from
oil which would be left in the ground if operations were
confined to primary methods, they constitute a part of the
general duty of diligent operation of the premises,
imposed upon the lessee as an implied covenant.2
5
The primary cases on which various authors rely to support
the principle of an obligation to use secondary recovery methods
were decided around midcentury.2 6 For example, in 1954 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "There is respectable authority
to the effect that there is an implied covenant in oil and gas leases
that a lessee should resort to a secondary recovery method shown to
be practical and presumably profitable as a means of getting
additional return from the lease. "27 However, that statement and
all the other early assertions of such a duty rested on dicta.
Despite this early recognition of the duty, it is significant that
the Waseco decision almost thirty years later is the first to squarely
25. Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 177, 181 (1951) (footnotes
omitted). As Merrill and others indicate, the duty of secondary recovery is traditionally considered a
part of the implied covenant of diligent operation. See, e.g., 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 59.1, at 102; 5
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, S 861.3, at 430. For additional discussion of this issue, see
Hughes, Legal Problems of Water Flooding, Recycling and Other Secondary Operations, 9 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. AND TAX'N 105, 116-20 (1958); Walker, Problems Incident to the Acquisition, Use and Disposal of
Repressuring Substances Used in Secondary Recovery Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 273, 285-88
(1961). Conceptually, treatise writers have placed the duty to apply enhanced recovery techniques,
such as waterflooding, fireflooding, and other secondary recovery methods, as coming under the
implied covenant of diligent operation. See, e.g., 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 9, § 59.1, at 102. Cf Waseco
Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil, 371 So. 2d 305, 307 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d
656 (La. 1979) (duty to fireflood considered within context of duty of diligent development); 40 LA.
L. REV. 974, 980 (1980) ( Waseco extends obligation of reasonable development to encompass the duty
to use enhanced methods ofoil recovery). It would seem that the duty partakes of elements of diligent
operations and developmental drilling, and in any event, proof of such a duty in any given context
would no doubt tend to take'on a hybrid quality, borrowing from both covenants.
26. Ramsey v. Carter Oil Co., 74 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Ill.), aff'd, 172 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 958 (1947); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950); In re
Shailer's Estate, 266 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1954).
27. In re Shailer's Estate, 266 P.2d 613, 616-17 (Okla. 1954). See Merrill. The Modtrn Image ofthe
Prudent Operator, 10 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 107 (1965). Professor Merrill notes that the principle
of law articulated in In reShailer's Estate found support in his own treatise. Id. at 117. See M. MERRILL,
supra note 9, S 77, at 192-94.
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hold that a lessor can enforce upon a lessee a duty to employ
secondary recovery techniques. 2 8 In doing so, the Waseco court
considered a variety of factors including geological data, the
number and location of wells drilled on leased lands and adjoining
property, the productive capacity of producing wells, the costs of
drilling operations compared with profits, the time between
completion of the last well and the demand for additional
operations, and the amount of disputed acreage. 29 For our
purposes, the question arises whether this analytical framework, as
applied to the facts, serves sufficiently to resolve the overriding
issues of technological feasibility and profitability of the proposed
method of recovery, issues likely to be critical in any litigation of
this nature.
The Waseco court considered the first factor, geological data, in
detail and concluded that the properties of the producing sands
under the lease in question were essentially the same as those
underlying adjacent leases and, therefore, were amenable to
fireflooding. Moreover, reserve estimates indicated a quantity of
oil sufficient to indicate a degree of profitability. 30
Considering the second factor, the number and location of
wells, the court found that Bayou State was not drilling any new
wells, whereas other operators had drilled hundreds of wells on
their leases.31 While there was no indication that the plaintiff
desired the drilling of developmental wells to recover additional
primary reserves, the lack of developmental activity of any type is
significant, especially in the context of the relatively feverish
drilling activity on nearby leases.
Third, regarding the productive capacity of the wells, the
evidence showed that the Scanland lease had declined from forty-
six barrels of oil per day in 1953 to six barrels of oil per day in 1976.
Other operators in the field had, by fireflooding, recovered millions
of barrels during the same period.32
As to the fourth factor, a cost and profit comparison, the court
observed, "Bellevue wells are shallow, closely spread (one or more
wells per acre), and are capable of being drilled with little risk,
inexpensively, in about 12 hours." 33 The court also indicated that
one of Bayou State's own fireflood projects had recouped its capital
28. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305, 306-07, 312 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979). See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 869, at 469;
MERRILL, supra note 27, at 119; 40 LA. L. REv. 974,977 (1980); 15 TULSA L.J. 597,597-98 (1980).
29. 371 So. 2d at 312.





expenditures and operating expenses within a five year period and
had since remained profitable.
34
With respect to the fifth factor considered by the court, the
time interval between wells, the evidence showed that Bayou State
had drilled no wells on the Scanland lease since its acquisition in
1953, although the lessor had made its demand for additional wells
several years before filing the lawsuit. 35 Although the plaintiff did
not seek the drilling of traditional development wells, 36 the total
absence of development activity was, again, important.
Finally, as to the amount of acreage involved on the leasehold,
the court may have considered the evidence showing increased
producing capacity of leases not only comparable in size, but even
much smaller than Bayou State's lease.37 In both development and
exploration situations the size of the tract is a factor in the
determination of potential profit.
38
Following its review of the facts, the Louisiana appellate court
upheld cancellation of the lease. 39 It is difficult to imagine a case
more suitable for the application of the principle that a reasonably
prudent operator has the duty to employ enhanced recovery
methods. The Waseco court, however, could have utilized its
framework of analysis to resolve more explicitly the central issues of
technological feasibility and profitability. It is clear that the court
considered fireflooding feasible, although the minimum sufficiency
of proof to require fireflooding is still uncertain. In a like manner,
the court did not succinctly state what degree of profitability must
ultimately be demonstrated. Given the current sophistication of
analysis by an operator of the profit potential of such a project, it is
perhaps disappointing that profitability was not addressed more
directly. In any event, the court's six part approach to the facts was
at the least a workable one in this case.
40
34. Id. at 312. The court's opinion reflected only the additional barrels of oil recovered on other
firefloods, but did not discuss the costs of recovery or an acceptable rate of return. The five year
payout on Bayou State's Wyche fireflood may or may not have been reasonable, assuming a similar
length of payout on the Scanland lease. It would have been helpful if the court had addressed the
assumptions made about the present and future price of the product and operating costs. See 40 LA.
L. REv. 974, 983 (1980) (uncertainty surrounding federal price controls).
35. 371 So. 2d at 311-13.
36. The fireflood would entail workover of some of the existing wells, abandonment of others,
and in all probability, drilling of additional wells. Thus, the covenants of development and diligent
operation are both applicable. See supra note 25.
37. 371 So. 2d at 311.
38. In Waseco Bayou State had several other tracts under lease in the field. Id. at 310-11.
39. Id. at 312. In addition to the facts discussed above, equitable notions almost certainly
influenced the court. The fact that Bayou State's expert testified to its financial limitations and the
admission by the company that its production in the field was geared to its refinery capacity were
probably persuasive. Id. at 311-12.
40. Although the court's approach was workable, this does not mean that outright lease
cancellation was the appropriate remedy. A general discussion of the subject of remedies in this
context is outside the scope of this Article.
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B. FIELDWIDE OPERATIONS
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court handed down a decision
that undoubtedly will materially impact the judicial realm in which
the prudent operator must function. Amoco Production Co. v.
Alexander4 was an action for damages by the Alexanders, royalty
owners in the Hastings West Field, Brazoria County, Texas,
against Amoco, the lessee-operator, because of fieldwide
drainage. 42 The field is a nonhorizontal water drive reservoir.
43
The leases located in the higher part of the reservoir are known as
"updip leases" 44 and, conversely, those located in the lower part,
as were the Alexanders' leases, are "downdip leases. ' ' 45 The
natural conditions inherent in such a field, once the production of
oil commences, operate to the disadvantage of the downdip leases
because the oil-water contact rises updip as the reservoir is
produced. Water being heavier than oil, the downdip wells are the
first to water out.4 16 Amoco held eighty percent of the field
production. Exxon, Amoco's chief competitor in the field, held
leases that lay between Amoco's updip leases and the downdip
Alexander leases.
47
The Hastings West Field began producing in 1934 and as of
1979 was producing 75,000 barrels of oil daily.4 8 In 1969 Amoco
commenced a large-scale "plug-back" 4 9 program, which resulted
in greater production from the field's higher producing sands and
greater acceleration of the updip migration of oil.5° In the same
year the Alexanders contacted Amoco to complain about the
decline in production on their leases and to suggest that offset
operators were doing a better job of producing their leases. Amoco
responded that they could do nothing about the situation. 51 Four
41. 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
42. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. 1981).
43. Id. at 566. The field "is highest (closer to the surface) in the southeast part. It is lowest in the
northwest. Hence, the reservoir dips downward gradually from the southeast to the northwest." Id.
44. An updip well is a "well located high on the structure where the oil is nearest the surface of
the field." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 805.
45. A downdip well is a "well located low on the structure where the oil is furtherest from the
surface of the field." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 201.
46. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 566.
47. Id. It may be significant to note that the Alexander leases were burdened with a one-sixth
royalty whereas Amoco's updip leases were only subject to a one-eighth royalty. Id. at 566, 569.
48. See Amoco Prod. Co. v, Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd as
,sodified, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981). See 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 600 (1980) (an analysis ofAmoco).
49 Plugging is the "sealing off of the fluids in the strata penetrated by a well, so that the fluid
from one stratum will not escape into another or to the surface." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra
note 12, at 552.
Amoco's "plug-back" program was " 'the standard practice' of producing from the lowermost
sand in the reservoir first and then 'plugging-back' to successively higher sands as the portion of the
well bore penetrating the lower sand became watered out." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594
S.W.2d at 472.
50. 594 S.W.2d at 472.
51. Id. at 479.
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years later the Alexanders again contacted Amoco complaining that
their leases had suffered a dramatic drop in production from 9000
barrels to 1900 barrels per month. They also drew attention to the
fact that Exxon's leases had improved their production. Amoco
again stated that it intended to take no corrective action.
52
Subsequently, the Alexanders filed suit alleging damages from
Amoco's failure to rework existing wells and failure to drill
replacement wells on the extreme updip portion of their leases.
5
1
Drilling the replacement wells would have required Amoco to
obtain an exception from the Texas Railroad Commission to the
well spacing rules applicable to the field. Such an exception is
traditionally granted upon a showing that it is necessary to prevent
waste or to protect the applicant's property from confiscation.
54
The Commission had previously granted Exxon and Amoco
twenty-two exceptions for the field. 55 Amoco had never applied for
any such exceptions on the Alexander leases.
56
In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court,
affirming the judgment of the district court and the court of civil
appeals,57 held that Amoco had the duty as a reasonably prudent
operator to protect the Alexander leases against fieldwide
drainage. 58 The court stated: "The duties of a reasonably prudent
operator to protect from field-wide drainage may include (1)
drilling replacement wells, (2) re-working existing wells, (3) drilling
additional wells, (4) seeking field-wide regulatory action, (5)
seeking Rule 37 exceptions from the Railroad Commission, (6)
seeking voluntary unitization, and (7) seeking other available
administrative relief. 59
Amoco's unsuccessful position in the litigation was, generally,
that no fieldwide duty to protect against drainage exists. While
admitting an obligation to protect against local drainage, Amoco
understandably argued that any broader duty would affect all leases
in the field, requiring each operator to drill fieldwide protection
52. Id
53. Id. at 470.
54. Id. at 475; 622 S.W.2d at 569.
55. 622 S.W.2d at 570. An "exception well" is a "well authorized or drilled as an exception
under the applicable well spacing rule." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 246. In
Texas the "statewide well spacing rule of the Texas Railroad Commission" is rule 37. Id. at 668.
"Rule 37 itself provides for two exceptions: (1) to prevent the confiscation of property, and (2) to
prevent waste." Id. at 669.
56. 622 S.W.2d at 569.
57. Actually, the supreme court reversed the grant of exemplary damages to the Alexanders, but
in all other material respects it affirmed thejudgment below. Id. at 572.
58. Id. at 568.
59. Id. While the case seems chiefly to have arisen under the implied covenant to protect against
drainage, the nature of the duties listed by the Texas Supreme Court also implicates the development
covenant. As in Waseco, the proof of prudent operations is a mixture of elements from more than one
implied covenant.
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wells. 60 Amoco concluded that a chain reaction would ensue,
resulting in the acceleration of fieldwide drainage. 6 1 The argument
appears to have merit. If each lessee drilled the offset wells to which
he was entitled or which he was obligated to drill, the result would
be accelerated production at a greater cost. Yet this scenario would
do nothing to prevent the natural water drive of the oil updip;
updip wells would still obtain the structural advantage.
62
Amoco also argued that the only feasible method of mitigating
fieldwide drainage is through fieldwide regulation by the Railroad
Commission .63
[T]he imposition of implied covenants in leases on a case
by case basis is an inefficient and unjust way to go about
it. The more orderly and only valid way is through the
regulatory authority of the Texas Railroad Commission
in regulating rates of production for the purpose of
protecting correlative rights in a field.
6 4
Amoco denied that any duty existed under Texas law to seek
administrative relief by applying to the Railroad Commission for
exceptions to the well-spacing regulations. 65 If such a duty were
imposed on Amoco, it would be placed in an inherent conflict
between its updip and downdip lessors, with each demanding
further inefficient and uneconomical drilling.
66
Finally, it appears from the opinion of the court of appeals that
Amoco also argued that even if the duty to prevent fieldwide
drainage existed as a general principle, the particular replacement
wells sought would not be "economically worthwhile" because
allowables on the updip wells would be transferred, in part, to the
new downdip wells. 67 This, in effect, was an argument tied to
fieldwide profitability.
60. Id. at 567-68.
61. Id. at 568.
62. Id. The opposite situation would occur if one allowed downdip operators and lessors to
recover all their oil in place prior to any of it migrating updip. After such recovery, the other
operators would produce their leases progressively updip. This method does not appear feasible since
updip operators would be required to shut-in their production until the oil-water contact had risen to
the downdip boundary of their lease. This method would do away with the Rule of Capture, along
with depriving updip lessees and lessors a timely return on their capital. Cf 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 4, § 822.4. at 102-03 (profit incentive in Rule of Capture assumes drainage of other
leaseholds).
63. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
64. Application for Writ of Error of Amoco Prod. Co. at 27, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander,
622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
65. 622 S.W.2d at 569-70.
66. Cf 12 ST. MARY'S L. .. 600, 608 (1980) (prudent operation of updip leases could require
Amoco to challenge any application for exception well).
67. 594 S.W.2d at 479.
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In finding such arguments unpersuasive, the Texas Supreme
Court properly "began at the beginning" by positing the prudent
operator standard as the touchstone and reasoning as follows:
"[B]ecause of the complexity of the oil and gas industry and
changes in technology, the courts cannot list each obligation of a
reasonably prudent operator which may arise. The lessee must
perform any act which a reasonably prudent operator would
perform to protect from substantial drainage. ", 68 "Oil lost by field-
wide drainage is just as lost as local drainage oil.",69 Tho prudent
operator would prevent such a loss by drilling replacement wells if
it could be demonstrated that such wells probably would be
profitable under the traditional standard of proof.70  The
Alexanders were able to prove that an operator could have drilled
replacement wells and reworked existing wells at a "handsome
profit.' '71
In the same fashion the court looked to the prudent operator
standard in finding a duty to seek an exception to the well-spacing
requirements for the replacement wells to be drilled on the
Alexander leases. 72 The court upheld the jury's determination that
a prudent operator, under the circumstances, would have applied
for the exceptions.7 3 Perhaps the court and jury further reasoned
that this duty to seek administrative relief only balanced Amoco's
right to such relief,74 particularly given the evidence that since 1975
Exxon and Amoco had been granted twenty-two rule 37 permits in
the same fault block section of the field. 75
In an equitable vein, the court indicated concern over
Amoco's inherent conflict of interest as common lessee:
The Alexander leases provided for 1/6th royalty while
Amoco's updip leases provided for 1/8th royalty. There is
no economic incentive for Amoco to increase production
on the Alexander lease because it will eventually recover
the Alexander's oil updip. Money invested in the
Hastings, West Field, will have a longer productive life if
invested updip. The greater the updip production the
sooner Amoco's competitor Exxon will water out. Money
68. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 96-97, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695-96 (1959)).
71. 594 S.W.2d at 479.
72. 622 S.W.2d at 569-70.
73. Id. at 570.
74. Cf Ramsey v. Carter Oil Co., 74 F. Supp. 481, 482 (E.D. Il1. 1947), aff'd, 172 F.2d 622 (7th
Cir. 1949) (discussion of right and duty to adopt proper gas repressuring systems).
75. 622 S.W.2d at 570.
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spent updip will yield greater returns than money spent
downdip because of higher daily production. With
downdip operators out of production Amoco can produce
its upper sands without competition and can begin
production from its lower sands where it does not have
significant production competition. 
7 6
The court, in effect, found that Amoco had placed itself in an
untenable position by having to play both ends against the middle.
Perhaps more interesting are the aspects of the court's opinion
relating to the duties to seek voluntary unitization and available
fieldwide regulatory action.77 Although pronouncements of such
duties are clearly dicta, the prudent operator would be well served
to bear them in mind. In fact, as to the situation in Amoco itself, one
writer has observed:
[T]he plaintiffs might even have enhanced their
entitlement to damages by proof that the field could and
should have been unitized (if in fact that had been
possible), since a unitized participation in the field
production would have endured as long as oil was
produced from the reservoir through wells on any lease in
the field, not merely the plaintiffs' leases.
78
Does the Amoco case stand for the principle that a reasonably
prudent operator has the duty to unitize to develop and protect his
leasehold? Again, over thirty years ago, Professor Merrill stated
with his customary vision:
The extraction process in a unitized field is not
foreign to the development and operative processes. All
are parts of a unified scheme of development, designed to
promote the efficient, economic and conservative
exploitation of the resources in the pool or field. The
unitization merely undertakes to make possible the sort of
exploitation which would have been possible if the land,
or the subsurface rights, had been in single ownership
from the beginning of the oil and gas industry. 79
76. Id. at 569.
77. Id. at 568.
78. Hoffman, Pooling and Unitization, in ADVANCED OIL GAS & MINERAL LAW COURSE D-12
(State Bar ofTexas Course, Oct. 1981). See 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 600, 605, 608-10 (1980).
79. Merrill, Unitization Problems: The Position of the Lessor, I OKLA. L. REV. 119, 126 (1948). See 6
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 935; Eckman, Statutory Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units: A Review for
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As indicated previously, Amoco argued that the only plausible
solution to its dilemma was a fieldwide approach. 80 At first glance
and as the court recognized in dicta, one fieldwide approach would
be voluntary unitization in the primary phase of recovery.81
Because of the natural structural advantage of the updip leases,
however, any unitization allocation formula would be doomed to
fail without crediting this advantage. Downdip leases would
presumably have to be credited for the additional reserves that
would have been recovered by drilling replacement wells. All
parties would have to be convinced that recovery of additional
reserves at additional profits could be assured. While the possibility
for achieving such a result might seem doubtful, the number of
unitization agreements that have been successfully negotiated
suggests that this approach is plausible in many circumstances, or
at the least, that a prudent operator will have the occasion to
investigate the feasibility of unitization. 8
2
Another idea implicit in the court's mention of fieldwide
regulatory relief83 would entail petitioning the regulatory body for
fieldwide allowable adjustments. Any such approach would
necessitate a formula that essentially would aim at the same
allocation and rate of production as the unitization formula,
although without the same complexities.
Future Agreements, 6 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 339 (1973); Hardy, Drainage of Oil and Gas from Adjoining
Tracts - A Further Development, 6 NAT. RESOURCES.J. 45, 48-49, 51 (1966); McDonald, Unit Operation
of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305 (1973); Merrill, Implied
Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 OKLA L. REV. 469, 478 (1949); Merrill, The Modern Image of
the Prudent Operator, 10 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 107, 124-25 (1965); Comment, Prospects for
Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization in Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 510 (1966).
Professor Merrill's observation in 1948 was simultaneously echoed by an American Bar
Association Committee of the Section of Mineral Law:
It is only through unit operation that the logical and complete application of present
technical knowledge of oil and gas conservation can be accomplished. It is only
through unit operation of a common source of supply that individual property rights
can be fully protected. It is only through unit operation that the maximum recovery
can be achieved and the maximum rate of daily production maintained.
CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY (B. Murphy ed. 1948), quoted in 1 R. MYERS, THE
LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.06, at 58 (2d ed. 1967).
80. It is interesting to note that while Amoco claimed the only solution to the problem was
fieldwide regulatory action, at the same time it argued that it had no duty to pursue administrative
relief from well-spacing requirements. 622 S.W.2d at 569-70. The court apparently saw the
contradiction when it set out a duty to seek fieldwide relief. Id. at 568.
81. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
82. Of course statutory unitization, which Texas lacks, would greatly increase the likelihood of
unitization in this instance. Amoco did not hesitate to remind the court of this fact:
The difficulty is compounded by the fact that any solution to the problem must
necessarily be of field-wide application. Further difficulty is added by the fact that
Texas has no statute authorizing compulsory field-wide unitization. . . .Thus the
Commission lacks the necessary authority to even begin to resolve the problem
properly.
Motion for Rehearing of Petitioner Amoco Prod. Co. at 9, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622
S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
83. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
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Within the context of fieldwide operations, then, the prudent
operator must take into consideration the development of the field.
This includes protecting leaseholds from substantial fieldwide
drainage, which may entail seeking exceptions to spacing
regulations, petitioning for fieldwide regulatory relief, or initiating
unitization.
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO EXPLORE FURTHER
One of the most interesting and much debated of the
covenants implied in oil and gas leases is the covenant of further
exploration. This covenant imposes a duty of additional drilling on
a leasehold in potentially productive strata that have not yet been
proved, when, under the circumstances, the failure to so drill is
unreasonable.8 4 Professors Williams and Meyers, the leading
proponents of the covenant of further exploration, list the following
as among the relevant circumstances for inquiry:
(1) the period of time that has elapsed since the last well
was drilled;
(2) the size of the tract and the number and location of
existing wells in relation thereto;
(3) the existence on the land of untested geological
formations favorable to the accumulation of hydrocarbon
substances;
(4) the attitude of the lessee toward further testing of the
land, and his operations on the land and elsewhere in the
vicinity in this regard;
(5) the feasibility of further exploratory drilling, including
the cost of drilling, the market for the product, and the
size of the block needed to justify a test well;
(6) whether part of the leasehold is excluded from a
production unit so that the lease is being preserved
thereon without the payment of royalty for such acreage
or the conducting of operations thereon.85
The lessor claiming breach of the covenant need not show that the
proposed additional exploratory well 86 probably would produce oil
84. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 841, at 258-59.
85. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, 5 841, at 259-60.
86. An exploratory well is a "well drilled in unproven or semi-proven territory for the purpose
of ascertaining the presence underground of a commercial petroleum deposit." WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
TERMIS, supra note 12, at 256.
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or gas in commercial quantities, 87 unlike the lessor demanding that
a development well88 be drilled in a proven formation.
8 9
The covenant to explore further, originally formulated by
Professor Charles J. Meyers in 1956, 90 is "segregated from the
covenant of reasonable development and separately labelled." 9 1 It
has not been accepted by all courts and commentators. 92 Recently,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered a proposal to adopt the
covenant in Oklahoma in an important case, Mitchell v. Amerada
Hess Corp. 93
Amerada Hess involved consolidation of eighteen cases brought
to cancel several twenty-three year old oil and gas leases situated in
two townships in Ellis County, Oklahoma. 94 Plaintiffs alleged that
exploration in the general area indicated the presence of numerous
potentially productive formations under the leaseholds, that
defendants had failed to explore the formations, and that the leases
were being held by marginal production for speculation. 95 The trial
court found that twelve years had lapsed without further drilling to
explore deeper formations. 96 The trial court ruled that all but one
of the defendants had breached an implied covenant to explore after
first production.9 7 It also decreed that the leases would be cancelled
as to all strata below the base of the producing formation unless the
defendants in breach commenced or participated in the drilling of a
single well to test the deeper Hunton Formation by July 1, 1979,98
approximately nine and one-half months from the date of the trial
court's judgment. 99
On direct appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the issue
was stated and restated as follows:
87. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 841, at 259, 263.
88. A development well is a "well drilled to a known producing formation in a previously
discovered field as distinguished from a wildcat, or exploratory, well and from an offset well."
WILLIAMIS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 186. See infra note 115 for the definition of a wildcat
well.
89. See 5 WILLIAMtS & MEYERS, supra note 4, §§ 843.3. 843.5, at 307-08. The authors state that
"Itihe party having the burden of proving that a well will produce in paying quantities must show
that drilling is more likely than not to result in commercial production." Id. § 843.5, at 307-08.
90. See Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1956). See also
Meyers, The Covenant ofFurther Exploration: A Comment, 37 TEX. L. REV. 179 (1958).
91. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, 5 841, at 263.
92. See, e.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, -, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (1959); 2 E. BROWN,
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 16.05 (2d ed. 1973); Merrill, The Implied Covenant for Further
Exploration, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 205 (1958). For further articles on the covenant of further
exploration, see the authorities cited in 5 WItLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 841, at 261 n.6.
93. 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981). See Pickerill, Is There a New Implied Covenant of Explorvelopment?, 31
INST. ON OtL & GAS L. & TAX'N 245. 279-81 (1980) (discussion of the trial court's decisionn inAmerada
Hess).
94. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.. 638 P.2d 441,442 (Okla. 1981).
95. Id. at 443.
96. Pickerill, supra note 93, at 279.
97. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.. 638 P.2d at 443.
98. Id.
99. Pickerill, supra note 93, at 279 n.99.
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[I]s an action maintainable in this jurisdiction to cancel a
lease for failure to further explore a lease premises during
a period in which paying production is had from the lease
premises.
. . . The ultimate issue resolving these appeals is the
question of the existence of an implied covenant to further
explore.
. . . The issue is: would a prudent operator, having due
consideration for the interest of both the lessee and lessor,
considering all factors, including what is known about the
market, the geology and adjoining activity, drill the
proposed well.' 0 0
The court rejected the proposed covenant, holding that "there
is no implied covenant to further explore after paying production is
obtained, as distinguished from the implied covenant to further
develop."'' 1  Unfortunately, some passages of the case are
ambiguous and contain faulty reasoning, leaving doubt as to the
precedential effect of the decision.
First, the opinion demonstrates confusion as to the analysis of
potential profit under the covenant of further exploration. The
court accurately states that Professor Meyers "proposes that the
profit motive is to be deemphasized in determining whether a
reasonably prudent operator would drill a well to previously
unknown sources .... ",102 Then, however, the court repeatedly
appears to claim that Professor Meyers' formulation not only
deemphasizes, but ignores, the issue of profit:
Failure to recognize the profit motive as an instrumental
force in oil and gas leases on behalf of both lessee and
lessor is to ignore the very essence of the contract ...
Meyers' formulation of the proposed implied covenant
ignores the potential for profit. . . . Can the duties of the
lessee be judged apart from the spectre of profit where the
activity is judged exploration rather than development?
To do so is unwise and unnecessary. . . . It is simply not
realistic to ignore profit as a consideration of the standard
of a prudent operator simply because the lessor demands
a wildcat be drilled on a productive lease rather than an
additional well to a productive formation. 1
03
100. 638 P.2d at 444, 446-47.
101. Id. at 449.
102. Id. at 446. The Amerada Hess court's statement is accurate if, by deemphasizing the profit
motive, the court means that Meyers proposes not to require proofofa likelihood of profit.
103, Id. at 447. The Oklahoma Supreme Court is not the only authority to overstate Professors
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These excerpts from Amerada Hess do not accurately capture
the approach taken by Professors Williams and Meyers on the
profitability issue. Profitability is not ignored and at least is implicit
in the evidence they suggest should be offered concerning the
demanded drilling; that is, evidence going to the size of the
leasehold, the favorable nature of any untested geological
formations, the lessee's exploratory testing operations on the
leasehold and in the area, the cost of drilling, the market for the
product, and the size of the lease block needed to justify a test
well. 104
While evidence of favorable geological prospects "falls far
short of proof that a well will probably produce oil or gas in
commercial quantities . it does show that there is some degree of
possibility that an exploratory well will be successful."1
0 5
Continuing this analysis, Professors Williams and Meyers state:
The difference is one of probabilities. The party having
the burden of proving that a well will produce in paying
quantities must show that drilling is more likely than not
to result in commercial production. In order to establish
breach of exploration covenant, this degree of probability
is not required. Taken together with other circumstances
showing that further delay in exploratory drilling is
unreasonable, it is enough that some possibility of
securing commercial production exists. 
106
The other factors also point in varying degrees of probability
to the chances for a successful well. Of course, the size of the
leasehold and the size of a lease block needed to justify a test well
relate principally to developmental drilling in the event the
Williams and Meyers' position on profitability. See Williams, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases.
Some General Principles, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 153 (1981). Williams states that "lilt is paradoxical that
the covenant of further exploration is governed by the prudent operator standard but, purportedly,
dispenses with any requirement of profitability." Id. at 174. Nevertheless, Williams' article is an
excellent analysis of implied covenants from the perspective of the discipline of economics. See also
Williams, Implied Covenants for Development and Exploration in Oil and Gas Leases - The Determination of
Profitability, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 443 (1979).
104. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, S 841, at 259-60.
105. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, S 843.5, at 305.
106. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, S 843.5, at 307-08. In a similar vein, the same authors
discussed a standard frequently seen in further exploration cases:
The standard of "a reasonable expectation of profit to the lessee" is one that lessors
can meet in exploration cases if "reasonable expectation" is defined in light of the fact
that the wells the lessor seeks are exploratory wells. In short, a prudent operator could
have a reasonable expectation of profit from a test well where the geological prospects
for discovering new production were favorable.
Id. § 845.6, at 358. See id. S 847, at 383 (a discussion of probabilities of success).
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exploratory well proves successful. The degree of exploratory
prospecting also is concerned, in part, with potential for a
profitable test. Cost of drilling and market demand are clearly
factors in assessing payout. Thus, the element of profit has not been
ignored by Professors Williams and Meyers. 107
A more serious problem in the Amerada Hess decision concerns
its lack of clarity in stating what degree of profitability is required.
In lieu of the covenant of further exploration, the Oklahoma court
states firmly that the covenant to further develop is sufficiently
flexible to resolve issues such as those raised in Amerada Hess:
The machinery to adjudicate an "exploration"
controversy exists presently in the form of the covenant to
diligently develop. The element of chance in achieving a
profit from any given drilling project is invariably present
and varies from a development situation to an exploration
only in its magnitude. The probability of a productive
well is a consideration presently existing in actions to
further develop, and the need for a new rule to supplant
further development litigation in cases where the odds of
profitability are low is to apply two rules of law to the
same legal issue .... To say as Meyers does that the covenant to
further develop requires the operator to drill only those wells which
must pay for themselves and pay a profit to boot is thus overly
restrictive. 108
Had the Amerada Hess court stopped there, it would be tempting to
say that form had triumphed over substance; that what was sought
by way of postulating a covenant of further exploration was given
in the name of the covenant of further development. The above
language clearly incorporates Williams and Meyers' previously
quoted thesis that the "difference is one of probabilities.," 10 9
Moreover, the Amerada Hess admonition that "all factors" must be
considered, including "the market, the geology, and adjoining
activity" 110 is consistent with Williams and Meyers' inquiry into
the reasonableness of the actions of the operator in all the
circumstances.
107. Professor Stephen Williams' explanation of an operator's reason for undertaking a wildcat
well that is more likely than not to be a dry hole incorporates risk-weighting, that is, weighing
possible outcomes by their probabilities. Included is the premise that a producing well will produce
income from itself and from wells drilled upon the basis of its success. See Williams, Implied Covenants
in Oil and Gas Leases: Some General Principles, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 153, 174 (1981). Williams and
Meyers' factors would seem to implicitly point toward such a risk-weighted analysis.
108. 638 P.2d at 447 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
109. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, 5 843.5, at 307.
110. 638 P.2d at 447.
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Yet the Amerada Hess court did not hesitate to reject the further
exploration covenant, and in doing so raised questions by
contradicting its earlier statements: "[T]he covenant . . . [of
further explorationj is substantially served by the covenant for
further development as it is interpreted in this jurisdiction while
limiting the duty to drill additional wells to those instances where a
prudent operator would expect a probability of potential profit
from the well contemplated."" '' The court then added a cryptic
footnote reading as follows: "In this regard it is necessary to
distinguish between probable expectations regarding this well and
the statistical figures for the industry."1
2
The effect of the above pronouncements is that those claiming
that an exploratory well need not be drilled, as well as those
demanding it be drilled, now can argue either that, under the
covenant for further development, proof of profitability is or is not
required. On the one hand, the opinion rejects the covenant of
further exploration, ignoring the element of profitability, and relies
instead upon the covenant of further development and its
traditional requirement of probable profit.'' 3 On the other hand,
the court suggests that one should not interpret the covenant of
further development in an "overly restrictive" fashion requiring
that the operator drill only those wells proven capable of
commercial production. 14
Placing the decision's ambiguities in the context of the further
exploration doctrine, including the case law and the extensive
commentary, we believe that Amerada Hess should be read as a
rejection of the covenant for further exploration in favor of a
covenant for further development. This covenant, in Oklahoma,
takes into account the fact that exploratory wells, from wildcats" 5
to step-outs' 6  to development wells in "spotty" fields, are
111. Id. at 449 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 449 n.3. The Amerada Hess court "declineld] to state that the issue of probable profit
is not a relevant consideration in an action to cancel a lease for failure to further develop thus
creating an action to cancel for failure to further explore." Id. at 448. This statement can be read to
mean one of at least three things, all in the context of a covenant of further development. First, that a
requirement of proof of probable profit is retained in all exploratory drilling requests. Second, that
the issue of probable profit, while relevant, is not a mandatory component of the showing required in
exploratory drilling requests, and third, that probable profit is an element in further development
actions and there is, therefore, no action to cancel for failure to further explore. The last option is
clearly a non sequitur.
113. Id. at 447, 449.
114. Id. at 447.
115. A wildcat well is an "exploratory well being drilled in unproven territory, that is, in a
horizon from which there is no production in the general area. Since the meaning is vague, it should
be observed that some wells are more wildcat than others." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note
12, at 834.
116. A step-out well is a "well drilled adjacent to a proven well but located in an unproven area;
a well drilled 'step-out' from proven territory in an effort to ascertain the extent and boundaries of a
producing formation." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 724.
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traditionally less than "probably profitable," yet are promising
enough to require testing. Testing includes, as it did in Amerada
Hess, 117 use of modern exploratory methods with time enough to
plan, budget, implement, and evaluate the results."18 Based upon
those test results, the covenant for further development under
Amerada Hess may require drilling a prospect, either a single test
well or a series of exploratory wells.' 1 9 In the event it is determined
that a prospect well should be drilled, the court should give due
regard for the investment decision of the current lessee in
fashioning the decree. For example, the period of time in which the
lessee must drill or lose the lease should be long enough to
accommodate corporate budgets and personnel deployments. 1
20
Despite the confusing nature of the Amerada Hess opinion, the
above reading would accommodate the facts and the court's
emphasis on the predominant analytical inquiry, the question of
profitability. It would also be consistent with the court's result, and
yet factor in worthwhile components of the Williams and Meyers'
approach.' 2' Nevertheless, until the Oklahoma Supreme Court
construes its most recent addition to the large body of case law on
further exploration efforts, there will be no comfortable degree of
certainty in the minds of lessors and lessees facing similar factual
circumstances.
IV. SCOPE OF THE COVENANTS AS REFLECTED IN
INDUSTRY PRACTICES TODAY
Waseco, Amoco, and Amerada Hess are interesting reminders of
the continued use of implied covenants in disputes between lessors
117. One participant in the Amerada Hess litigation described evidence of exploratory activities
offered by the defendants as "voluminous and uncontested showing sizeable expenditures by various
parties as recently as within one year prior to the litigation and at varying intervals for many years
prior. " Pickerill, supra note 93, at 280 n. 100.
118. Presumably because of the rejection of the covenant of further exploration, the Amerada
Hess court accepted what was apparently an invitation by plaintiffs' counsel to treat their petition and
the record on appeal as urging cancellation of the leases under the traditional covenant to further
develop. The court found that the defendants were justified in continuing to test the deeper
prospects, particularly in light of the fact that the plaintiffs themselves would require further testing
and because the plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate that immediate drilling would take place if
the leases were cancelled. 638 P.2d at 450.
119. In Amerada Hess the trial court required the drilling of a single test well only. Id. at 443. On
cross-appeal, plaintiffs argued that a well should be drilled on each lease premises. Id. The issue
became moot because of reversal of the trial court's holding that any well should be drilled. Id. Cf
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310, 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
952 (1960) (appellate court affirmed the trial court's conditional decree ordering a five year drilling
program requiring six wells to be drilled per year for failure to exercise reasonable diligence in
exploring 90,000 acres under lease).
120. See generally Williams, supra note 107, at 167-68 (discussion of "entrepreneurial capacity" of
lessee and capital acquisition costs in the context of the lessee's failure to adopt the lessor's likely
profitable proposal).
121. Note Williams and Meyers' opinion of Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684
(1959), which rejected, at least in name, the covenant for further exploratinn. "It thus appears that
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and lessees over the prudence of the latter's actions.1 22 They are
good examples, too, of the increasingly sophisticated nature of the
prudent operator's world today. The variety, complexity, and
magnitude of industry operations will undoubtedly create further
litigation of a novel or pressing nature. A brief examination of
current and future industry activities, particularly in the realm of
onshore enhanced recovery as defined herein, should assist
interested observers and practitioners in understanding the state of
the art as practiced by the prudent operator. 
123
A. WATERFLOODING
Waterflooding 2 4 is the most widely used method of enhanced
recovery, which, one source claims, had its origins in the 1870s.125
By 1973 approximately one-half the production of our domestic oil
came from reservoirs affected by waterflooding. 2 6 Continued use
of waterflooding is assured. The prudent operator has been alert to
its use and will continue to be so. Moreover, given the experience
gained over the years, the advancements in field and laboratory
technology, increasing use of computer simulation, and improved
economics, fields never before considered for waterflooding are
now candidates for this method of secondary recovery.
One recent example is the formation of the North Hobbs Unit
in Lea County, New Mexico. 27  The Hobbs Grayburg - San
Andres Pool underlies a substantial part of the city of Hobbs, New
Mexico. It is one of the state's oldest producing pools and is a
an exploration obligation may exist in Texas law but that it must ... be denominated as an implied
covenant to reasonably develop. . . . [Alt least the case does not preclude the granting of relief for
failure to explore under the proper circumstances. " 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, S 845.6, at
358. The Amerada Hess court cited the Koontz decision as support for its rejection of the covenant of
further exploration on the ground that Texas, like itself. found that the covenant of further
exploration rejected an expectation of profit as an essential element in the exploratory drilling
analysis. 638 P.2d at 447, 449 (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959)).
122. See generally M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940). See
also 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, S 801, at I (continued vitality of law of implied covenants is
reflected in "a steady flow of litigation and a rising tide of legal literature").
123. For previous comment in this area, see Merrill, The Modern Image of the Prudent Operator, 10
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 107 (1965); Pickerill, Is There a New Implied Covenant of Explorvelopment?,
31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 245, 288-89 (1980); Roark, Advancing Technology andthe Relationship
Between the Lawyer and the Engineer, 19 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 143 (1968); Comment, Secondary
Recovery of Oil & Gas - The Rule ofPositive Dominion, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 457 (1974).
For histories of petroleum technology, see EXECUTIVE COiMM. ON DRILLINC & PROD. PRACTICE,
Div. oF PROD., AM. PETROLEUM INST., HISTORY OF PETROI.EUM ENGINEERING (1961): 1946-1965
NAT'L PETROLEUM COUNCIL, IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
(1967).
124. Waterflooding is "olne method of secondary recovery in which water is injected into an oil
reservoir for the purpose of washing the oil out of the reservoir rock and into the bore ofa producing
well." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 821.
125. NOYES DATA CORP., ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY: SECONDARY AND ifETIARY METHODS 19
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOYES DATA CORP.].
126. Id
127. New Mexico Oil Conservation Comm'n Case Nos. 6652, 6653 (1979),
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northwest-southeast trending anticline about eight miles long and
three and one-half miles wide. Discovered in 1928, the pool was
producing by 1930 about 1,000,000 barrels of oil per month from
135 wells. As a result 'of continuing operations, the producing
capacity of most wells tapered off. By 1975, bottom-hole pressures
for most wells had declined, in many cases to as little as one-third of
their initial bottom-hole pressures.
In 1970 Amoco initiated efforts to unitize the entire pool for
the purpose of instituting a waterflood, but had to abandon its
efforts in 1973 when working interest owners could not agree on a
participation formula. 28 When Amoco abandoned its efforts, Shell
undertook the effort to unitize the northern portion of the pool (the
North Hobbs Pool or the pool). All operators in the North Hobbs
Pool were invited to a meeting in 1973 at which time a Working
Interest Owners' Committee and a Technical Committee were
formed. The Technical Committee was comprised of engineering
representatives from all the working interest owners. The
committee undertook the task of determining the feasibility and
profitability of instituting a pressure maintenance project and
concluded that such a project would result in enhancing the
recovery of the pool by fifty-five million barrels of oil, in addition to
the remaining primary recovery of more than thirty-three million
barrels. The committee proceeded deliberately in completing its
study, not going forward until there was a substantial majority
consensus on each issue before it. Otherwise, the committee feared
there might be no more opportunities to unitize the field due to its
depleted state.
The pool was exceedingly complex, consisting of various oil
producing horizons overlain by a gas cap. The pool covered more
than 10,000 acres and had 88 separate tracts with 905 royalty
owners and 80 working interest owners sharing interests in the
pool. Moreover, the pool was old and, therefore, contained many
open hole completions. The completion and production histories of
many wells were lacking or incomplete. 29 Furthermore, the upper
portion of the San Andres formation had experienced water influx,
which made estimating its reserves nearly impossible.
After numerous meetings over a span of four years, the
128. Nevertheless, Amoco succeeded in forming a voluntary unit which comprised the southern
third of the pool and which became effective January 1. 1975. Certain lessees refused to join, which
left some "windows" in the unit, but waterflood operations were nevertheless undertaken with
respect to the participating leases. A "window" is a ''term used to describe an unsigned interest
affecting a pooled or unitized area." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 835.
129. For example, logs, core samples, and other technical data were missing on many of the
wells in the pool.
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committee came to substantial agreement and completed its
Technical Report, which set forth estimates of remaining primary
and secondary oil and gas reserves on a tract by tract basis. In
establishing these estimates, the committee divided the pool into six
different study zones corresponding to the various producing
horizons, each possessing different structural characteristics and
production data. Because of the complexity, customary engineering
approaches were deemed inadequate to meet the task. With the
consent of the Working Interest Owners' Committee, the
Technical Committee proceeded to employ a computerized
reservoir simulation model developed by Shell. Each working
interest owner was afforded the opportunity to participate in the
application of the model to the reservoir data, projected waterflood
development, and respective ownership interests. The results of the
computer simulation were accepted by over eighty percent of the
members of the Technical Committee. The Technical Report also
contained estimates of the total investment required for the water
injection project and the total expected profit on a discounted basis
with and without unitization.
In May 1977 the committee submitted the Technical Report to
the Working Interest Owners' Committee, which accepted the
report as accurate and as a basis for unitization negotiations. The
Working Interest Owners' Committee then undertook the task of
developing a participation formula for the approximately 1,000
mineral interest owners in the pool. At least seventy-five percent of
the mineral owners had to approve the formula before an
application for statutory unitization of the pool could be made to
the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission. Various formulas
were proposed by several of the participants.
The participation formula, which included cost sharing,
divided primary and secondary recovery into three phases. The
first phase encompassed the period of time until acceleration of the
primary recovery by the waterflood. The second phase covered
accelerated recovery of the primary reserves, and the third phase
covered the recovery of the remaining reserves. Benefits to be
gained by those owners who mainly had primary reserves were
equitably weighted with those owners whose remaining reserves
were principally secondary. The participation formula adopted
eventually received eighty-five percent approval of the working
interest owners.
A major operator in the field remained doggedly recalcitrant,
thereby forcing Shell to bring the matter to a hearing before the
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New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission. The operator
complained that the participation formula did not allocate its fair
share of oil reserves in the pool and unjustly burdened it with the
costs of the project. Evidence showed that this operator had placed
submersible pumps on some of its wells in the field, thereby
accelerating its primary production in the pool. This action was
undoubtedly a legitimate course of action until unitization was
effectuated, but it provided an unconvincing challenge to the
validity of the computer simulation's reserve estimates. Nine years
after first efforts at unitization, the entire Hobbs Grayburg-San
Andres was unitized. 1
30
B. PRESSURE MAINTENANCE
Pressure maintenance refers to the injection of gas, water, or
other fluids into reservoirs to maintain or bolster reservoir pressure
to enhance the recovery of the hydrocarbons.' 3 ' Substantial
increases in primary recovery of the original oil in place can be
achieved with a program of pressure maintenance, which is
implemented prior to the loss of the natural or formation
pressure. 32 For years, prudent operators have been alert to the
need for such programs.
C. INFILL DRILLING
Infill drilling in the context of enhanced recovery is drilling a
well or wells within a standard spacing unit in addition to the
original well drilled on that unit.13 3 Regulatory approval is
generally required and, when obtained, permits the operator to
escape the handicap of a reduced allowable. 134 Some sources
indicate that infill drilling will play an increasingly important role
in production of domestic reserves. 35 In any event, the prudent
130. See New Mexico Oil Conservation Comm 'n Case Nos. 6652, 6653 (1979).
131. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 567.
132. NoYEs DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 18.
133. An infill well has also been defined as a "well drilled on an irregular pattern disregarding
normal target and spacing requirements." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 362.
134. An allowable is the "amount of oil (or gas) which a well, leasehold, field, or state is
permitted to produce under production orders of a state regulatory commission." WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 26-27.
In secondary recovery projects operators may apply for infill drilling orders to permit the
drilling of an infill well. Id. at 362. "The IW order [infill well drilling order] will specify one
minimum allowance for each developed drilling spacing unit irrespective of the number of wells that
are drilled in it." Id.
135. One authority estimates that recovery from infill drilling in the Gulf and West Texas
Basins will approximately equal the ultimate conventional recovery of 51 billion barrels. Fisher, Oil
in Texas Yesterday Today, TIPRO REP., Fall 1981, at 10, 13. Other experts postulate that if infill
drilling is properly done, it will produce at least as much oil as has been produced by primary
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operator will seek out answers to the feasibility of infill drilling and,
when justified, obtain the necessary regulatory approval.
Illustrative are the two infill drilling programs initiated by the
El Paso Natural Gas Company in the Blanco Mesaverde and Basin
Dakota Pools in San Juan and Rio Arriba Counties, New
Mexico. 136 When the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
considered El Paso's request for permission to drill infill wells in the
Blanco Mesaverde Pool, there were already approximately 2,055
wells under production on 900,000 acres. The pool was operated on
spacing units of 320 acres. Original proven reserves for the existing
wells were estimated to be 8.665 trillion cubic feet. Cumulative
production at the time of the hearing was approximately 3.723
trillion cubic feet.
El Paso, based upon its experience with the pool, had
concluded that one well would not adequately drain a 320 acre unit.
Specifically, it believed the pool to be more heterogeneous than it
was originally understood to be. 13 7 To test drainage three test wells
were drilled, shut-in, and not allowed to produce. Through these
wells El Paso could make a determination of any decline in
pressures, which would indicate probable drainage by offsetting
wells. While some drainage apparently did occur, its relative
insignificance convinced El Paso of the soundness of its preliminary
conclusions. El Paso was also encouraged by developments in
completion techniques over the years, particularly advances in well
fracturing. 138
Some of the other operators in the pool were less convinced of
the merits of El Paso's proposal. El Paso's dual status as producer
and purchaser complicated the matter, but the strongest
disagreement concerned whether additional wells would increase
estimated reserves in place. If the reserves could not be increased,
additional wells could possibly drain offsetting premises and
accelerate recovery of the reserves at a substantial and unwarranted
cost. A shortage of tubular goods and a relative unavailability of
methods. Van Everdingen & Kriss, A Proposal to Improve Recovery Efficiency, 32 J. OF PETROLEUM TECHi.
1164, 1164 (July 1980). The latter authorities claim that the combination of infill drilling and
waterflooding for pressure maintenance can increase average recovery efficiency to at least 50%.
Van Everdingen & Kriss. Why Can't We Get More Oil From the Ground?, DRILL BIT, May 1981, at 102,
110.
136. New Mexico Oil Conservation Comm'n Cases 5264, 6533 (1974, 1979).
137. El Paso believed that the pool had a good degree of lensing, including variation in the areal
extent of the lenses, and that it had significant variations in permeability and porosity.
Lensing is the "thinning out of a stratum in one or more directions." U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, A DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL AND RELATED TERMS 636 (P. Thursh ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR]. A lens is a "relatively porous, permeable,
irregularly shaped, sedimentary deposit surrounded by impervious rock. The lens may serve as a
local center of concentration of oil in the formation." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at
396.
138. Fracturing is a "process of breaking a fluid-bearing strata by injecting a fluid under such
pressure as to cause partings in the strata rock." U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 137, at 460.
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drilling rigs heightened the operators' fears that those who could
drill the fastest would obtain an unfair advantage. Moreover, the
infill program might subject the offset operators to burdensome
demands by lessors, under the implied and express covenants of
their leases, for drilling protection wells unjustified by prudent
operation or for payment of unjustified compensatory royalties.
There was also disagreement over regulatory treatment of prices on
gas from the new wells to be drilled, the amount of a discount
factor, if any, to be applied to the projected returns, cost of drilling
and operating the new wells, the estimation of a reasonable rate of
return in the face of the cost of capital, and the effect of deploying
that capital and equipment inventory in this pool rather than on
other projects.
The New Mexico Conservation Commission heard the
evidence, decided in favor of El Paso, and infill drilling
commenced. Five years later, El Paso again returned to the
Commission with another application for infill drilling, this time in
the deeper Basin Dakota Pool, which was located in the same basin
as the Blanco Mesaverde Pool. Uncontested expert testimony on El
Paso's behalf established, to the Commission's satisfaction, the
viability of the proposed drilling. Estimated original recoverable
reserves had been placed at five trillion cubic feet. Projected
additional recoverable reserves were set at four to four and one-half
trillion cubic feet. El Paso supported its position, in part, by
preliminary indications of successful infill drilling in the Blanco
Mesaverde Pool, increased sophistication in reservoir analysis from
the earlier infill drilling experience, and an improved economic
climate for natural gas.
Another operator joined in supporting El Paso's request based
upon its own analysis, including sophisticated computer simulation
and test drilling. The computer analysis included use of log and
core data and net pay, water saturation, and porosity and
permeability figures from seventy-eight existing wells chosen from
throughout the pool. The analysis yielded projections of future
performance, including calculations showing the time and rates of
production, cumulative production, and reservoir pressure. It
demonstrated that the drainage pattern for wells with a fifty year
life was approximately 163 acres. This sophisticated generation of
technical data persuasively argued in favor of infill drilling. What
originally seemed farfetched to many operators proved to be quite
prudent upon close examination. 
1 39
139. While the examples of Shell's waterflood and El Paso's infill drilling programs are
somewhat dramatic owing to the scope of the projects and the magnitude of effort put into them, the




Thermal processes involve methods of increasing recovery of
low gravity crude oil by heat application. 40 Heat is applied to the
reservoir to reduce the viscosity of the oil, activate a solution gas
drive in certain circumstances, create increased relative
permeability by thermal expansion of the oil, create distillation
and, in certain cases, induce thermal cracking of the oil.t4i Two
basic methods are used, steam injection and combustion methods.
Steam injection is the most advanced and widely used of the
tertiary recovery methods. 142 It can be either cyclic, when the steam
is injected and the reservoir is allowed to "soak" before the heated
oil flows back (the "huff and puff" method), or steam drive, with
continuous injection of steam by injection wells and withdrawal of
the displaced oil by production wells (steamflooding).1 4 3 Com-
bustion methods, or fireflooding, as exemplified in the Waseco
case,' 44 involve injecting hot air into the reservoirs to cause ignition
of the hydrocarbons with heat and gases, which move the oil to the
production wells. 
1 45
Steamflooding was responsible for recovering 300,000 barrels
of oil per day from over 40,000 acres in 1980 and it is projected to
recover I to 1.5 million barrels per day from 110,000 to 180,000
acres in 1 99 1 .i46 Projected additions to domestic recoverable
reserves by use of steamflooding have been estimated at
approximately nine to ten billion barrels.14 7 While fireflooding is
not expected to produce nearly as much otherwise unrecoverable
hydrocarbons as steamflooding,148 developments still continue. For
example, Texaco recently announced a pilot fireflood project in
Louisiana, which, it was estimated, could lead to an additional
ultimate recovery of ten to fifty million barrels of heavy oil from its
Louisiana acreage in the next ten years.1 49 Given an estimated 150
thermal projects underway in 1980,150 there is no doubt this area of
indicate feasibility and profitability, then the prudent operator must proceed or risk being held
accountable by the lessor.
140. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 12, at 769.
141. NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 65.
142. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE U.S., ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY
POTENTIAL IN THE U.S. 27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT].
143. Id.
144. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979).
145. OFFICE OP TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 28-29.
146. See Big EOR Production Hike Seen From Chemicals, 79 OIL & GAs., Aug. 17, 1981, at 74-75.
See also INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA 246 (1981).
147. NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 76.
148. See NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 80-81; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Supra
note 142, at 27, 45.
149. Texaco Plans Louisiana Fireflood, 79 OIL & GAS.J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 59.
150. See INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA 251 (1981).
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enhanced recovery will receive further attention by the prudent
operator.
E. CARBON DIOXIDE MISCIBLE FLOODING
One of the most promising new techniques in the field of
enhanced recovery is carbon dioxide miscible flooding. "Miscible
processes are those in which an injected fluid dissolves in the oil it
contacts, forming a single oil-like liquid that can flow through the
reservoir more easily then [sic] the original crude. ' 151 Because of
the likelihood of extensive use of carbon dioxide in future enhanced
recovery, a more elaborate summary follows.
15 2
Carbon dioxide that has been compressed enough for injection
into the tiny pore spaces of the rock where oil remains trapped is
often nearly as dense as the oil itself. At such conditions, the carbon
dioxide dissolves well in the oil. For instance, at pressures (2,000
pounds per square inch) and temperatures (100 degrees
Fahrenheit) typical of oilfields in New Mexico and west Texas,
carbon dioxide will occupy a third of the volume of a mixture of oil
saturated with dissolved carbon dioxide. In other words, dissolved
carbon dioxide swells the oil, expanding its volume by about fifty
percent. Thus, tiny droplets of trapped oil expand as carbon
dioxide dissolves in them, and they become easier to displace to a
producing well. Oil that contains dissolved carbon dioxide moves
more easily through the porous rock because it is much less viscous
than the same oil containing no carbon dioxide.
Furthermore, when carbon dioxide mixes with oil, it not only
dissolves efficiently, it also extracts hydrocarbons from the oil into
the remaining carbon dioxide. The resulting mixture of carbon
dioxide and hydrocarbons does a better job of displacing oil than
carbon dioxide alone. On a laboratory scale, the displacement
process can be very efficient. If the pressure is high enough, carbon
dioxide can recover all but three to five percent of the oil remaining
after a waterflood.
In actual oilfields recoveries will be lower, because it is more
difficult to control large scale movements of fluids in the
multilayered reservoir rocks than it is in small laboratory size rock
samples. Also, low viscosity carbon dioxide may not sweep all the
reservoir rocks because it is difficult to push a thick fluid with a thin
151. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 29.
152. The textual information concerning carbon dioxide miscible flooding is based chiefly upon
materials supplied to the authors by Dr. F.M. Orr. Head, Miscible Flood Research. Petroleum
Recovery Research Center. New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology.
528
ENHANCED RECOVERY
one. Indeed, the principal technical problem with carbon dioxide
flooding is the prevention of early breakthrough of carbon dioxide
into the producing wells, an indication that only part of the oil
reservoir was swept. Because of these difficulties, typical estimates
are that approximately twenty-five percent of the oil remaining
after waterflooding can be recovered. In any event, oil companies
are betting billions of dollars that enough oil can be recovered by
carbon dioxide flooding to justify pipelines to carry carbon dioxide
from natural reservoirs in southwest and southeast Colorado and in
northeast New Mexico to the large oilfields of the Permian Basin in
western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. Another pipeline is
scheduled to be constructed from Big Piney, Wyoming over 500
miles to the Powder River and Williston Basin fields of Wyoming,
Montana, and North Dakota. Countless smaller projects are also
underway or in the planning stages, including many whose source
of carbon dioxide is the industrial smokestack.
Detailed assessments of the economics involved in carbon
dioxide flooding are difficult to make because prices of carbon
dioxide and the amounts required are still uncertain. Estimates of
the amount of carbon dioxide required to produce a barrel of oil
vary widely, from four to twenty thousand cubic feet at standard
surface conditions, which is equivalent to about two to nine barrels
of carbon dioxide at reservoir conditions. Estimates of the cost of
carbon dioxide also vary widely, though most fall into the range of
$1.00 to $3.50 per thousand cubic feet. Thus, the cost of carbon
dioxide alone will be large.
In 1980 approximately 79,000 barrels per day of domestic
crude oil were attributable to the use of carbon dioxide and other
gases in the miscible flooding process. 5 3 Naturally, projections of
ultimate recoveries vary. One study, using a 1978 assumption of
$22 per barrel of crude oil, concluded that 8.5 to 16.3 billion barrels
would be recovered by the year 2000.154 It is clear, then, that in
certain fields prudent operations may dictate that carbon dioxide
pilot projects be implemented, to be followed, when justified, by
full scale operations. 15
5
F. SURFACTANT-POLYMER FLOODING; MICELLAR OR
MICROEMULSION FLOODING
The newest and most complex of the enhanced recovery
153. See INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA 246 (1981).
154. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 42.
155. Some cautious operators in the Permian Basin have in fact been negotiating for com-
mitments of carbon dioxide reserves for eventual use on their wells.
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processes is surfactant-polymer flooding, also known as
microemulsion or micellar flooding. 156  Some consider the
technique to possess the greatest long-term potential for recovering
significant amounts of tertiary oil. 157 This type of flooding relies on
detergent-like chemicals or surfactants (surface active agents) to
reduce the surface tension between the water and the oil. These
chemicals are comprised of molecules which, on one end, are
repelled by water, and on the other, attracted to it. The oil is thus
organized into droplets called micells, which are much smaller than
normal oil particles, and therefore move much more easily through
the formation. The oil and surfactant slug is then driven toward
production wells by injected water which has been treated by
polymers to effectively match the water to the slug. 158 Because of
the present experimental nature of surfactant-polymer flooding,
estimates of recovery capability vary widely. One source predicts
1.4 million barrels per day by 1996159 and another predicts from 1.3
to 2.5 million barrels per day by 2000.160 The first source predicts
that nine billion barrels of tertiary oil will be recovered through
surfactant-polymer flooding over a thirty year period. 
16 1
G. MASSIVE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF TIGHT GAS BASINS
Massive hydraulic fracturing is "a newly developing, large-
scale application of fracturing techniques' '1 6 2 that, where applied
successfully, converts otherwise noncommercial tight gas
formations 1 63 into profitable production.1 64 One report estimates
that up to 7.7 trillion cubic feet of gas could be produced annually
by 1990 at prices of $4.50 per million cubic feet. 65 Another
government report states boldly that "[e]nhanced gas recovery,
primarily by massive fracturing of tight sands, is projected to be the
156. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 31.
157. NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 56.
158. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 31.
159. NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 63 (Lewin and Assocs., Inc. prediction).
160. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 142, at 41.
161. NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 63 (Lewin and Assocs., Inc. forecast).
162. NOYES DATA CORP., UNCONVENTIONAL NATURAL GAS 35 (1980).
163. Tight gas is gas found in sands of such low permeability that commercial production has
not generally been possible without extensive formation stimulation. Id. at 4-5. The low per-
meability, or resistance to flow, is 5 to 2,000 times greater than typical oil and gas producing
formations. Id. at 6. Tight gas sands also vary from single, thin gas-bearing beds of generally
uniform thickness to multiple, lens-shaped sands interbedded with clays and shales. Id. The San
Juan Basin, which includes the Basin Dakota and Blanco Mesaverde reservoirs, contains tight,
blanket gas sands. Id. at 57.
164. See id. at 4-7, 23-97 (discussion of tight gas basins).
165. Id. at 5 (noting Lewin and Assocs. 1978 Report of Enhanced Recovery). A large portion of
such production would likely be from blanket sands formations where, owing to more favorable
reservoir conditions, industry has already achieved considerable production. Id.
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major source of natural gas in 2020. ' ' 166 As technology develops
and natural gas prices increase, the prudent operator will be in the
forefront of enhanced gas recovery.
H. EXoTICS
Brief reference should be made to certain potentially viable
techniques that indicate the space-age possibility of enhanced
recovery. One such technique, not proven successful, utilizes
underground nuclear explosions to fracture the formation, thereby
increasing recovery of hydrocarbons. 167 Another possible method
employs microorganisms, particularly bacteria, to bring about
beneficial reactions in a petroleum reservoir. These reactions
include gas production and a possible repressurizing of the
reservoir, production of substances that act on the surface of the
formation rock to release hydrocarbons, production of solvents to
alter the oil's viscosity and raise its gravity, selective plugging of
portions of a formation by microorganism growth and cell division,
production of polymers by microorganisms to provide a polymer
drive, and production of acids to favorably alter formation
characteristics. 1
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I. ADVANCING EXPLORATORY TECHNOLOGY
Several years ago one successful independent pithily described
the predicament of the prudent operator as an explorationist in
modern times: "Economic necessity has precluded the shotgun and
demanded the rifle.' 1 69 The same individual also identified the
techniques that he had come to use as his ammunition: seismic
geophysical prospecting, geochemical prospecting, microgravity
analysis, electromagnetics, aerial and satellite photography,
infrared photography using various color techniques, and airborne
radiation surveys. 170 Moreover, once drilling has commenced,
166. 3 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
172.
167. See NOYES DATA CORP., supra note 125, at 82-85. See also Roark, supra note 123, at 159
(noting joint El Paso Natural Gas Co. and federal government "Gasbuggy" project utilizing 26
kiloton nuclear device).
168. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, CONTRACTS FOR FIELD PROJECTS AND SUPPORTING RESEARCH ON
ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY AND IMPROVED DRILLING TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS REVIEW No. 27, 127
(1981) (entitled "Development of a Procedure for the Microbiological Evaluation of a Petroleum
Reservoir"). See also Wall StreetJ., Sept. 2, 1981, at 39, cols. 3-4, in which the optimistic prediction
is made by Edward Lanphier, director of International Resources Development, Inc., Norwalk,
Connecticut, that microbial oil recovery may achieve four billion barrels per year, or over ten million
barrels per day, with tangible results seen in the 1990s. Id.
169. Kidd, An Independent's Experience With Various Exploration Techniques, 13 EXPLORATION &
ECON. OF THE PETROLEUM INDUS. 99, 108 (1975).
170. Id. at 100-08.
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exploration does not end. Standard of Indiana has developed a
camera three inches in diameter and twelve feet long, which films
formations for photographic examination on the surface.171 Also,
Arco is experimenting with an oil rig capable of curving the drill
pipe at five degrees per foot drilled. Horizontal drilling is thereby
achieved within eighteen feet and, it is hoped, can be continued for
some distance. 1712 The list of techniques is seemingly endless and
continues to grow. 7 3 To the extent an implied covenant of further
exploration exists in any jurisdiction, the examination of a lessee's
actions will include an analysis of his good faith and sophistication
in pursuing modern exploratory methods.
V. CONCLUSION
For many years, conflicts surrounding the oil and gas lease
have been discussed, debated, and litigated. Implied covenants,
unwritten promises by the lessee, have been involved in their share
of these disputes. Because every lessee, by entering the lease
contract, will be held to a promise to act in accordance with the
standards of the industry, the prudent operator will continue to be
the measure of a lessee's performance in any such dispute. 
17 4
Given an industry that has been a stimulus for change in this
century, the propagation of a large number of cases and a good deal
of commentary comes as no surprise. Waseco, 1 5 Amoco, 176 and
Amerada Hess'77 are recent examples of the vitality of the implied
covenants and the prudent operator. Without claiming to be
hallmarks, they demonstrate that the prudent operator continues to
adapt to changing circumstances. In each case a workable result
was attained. In each case a problem of enhancing gain from
natural resources was brought forth and resolved.
It is interesting, perhaps instructive, to draw some further
conclusions from the common elements of these three factually
different disputes. In Waseco the issue of profitability was not
explicitly resolved. Yet, as discussed previously, the approach of
171, Wall Street.J., Feb. 12, 1982, at 29, col. 4.
172. Id.
173. See generally NOYES DATA CORP., GEOPHYSICAL AND GEOCHEMICAl TECHNIQUES FOR EXPLO-
RATION OF HYDROCARBONS AND MINERALS (1980) (description of exploratory techniques based on
United States patent literature).
174. See Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery, 4 OKLA. L. REV. 177, 193 (1951). See also
M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 221-223, at 464-74 (2d ed. 1940). In
1940 Professor Merrill predicted that the implied covenants would retain their vitality because of the
relation between the parties to an oil and gas lease. Id. § 227, at 480-81.
175. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979).
176. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
177. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
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the court in resolving the issue apparently produced the correct
result. 78 Waseco did not foreclose further definition of an operator's
ability to economically employ current technology in the enhanced
recovery of hydrocarbons. At the same time, the case fulfilled a
longstanding prophecy that a lessor can require the operator to
carry out secondary recovery operations. 179 Paradoxically, the
subject matter of the lawsuit was not waterflooding, which had
been discussed and practiced as a means of prudent operation for
many years. Instead, a comparatively exotic form of recovery,
fireflooding, was required. Several other methods of enhanced
recovery following original development of a reservoir have been
utilized for years without one lawsuit culminating in a decree that
any such method must be performed. This fact speaks well for the
competitive nature of the oil and gas industry and its ability to
confront and resolve disputes before they reach the judicial forum.
In this regard also, the talent and expertise of the conservation
regulators of the industry should not be overlooked. 1
80
Although Waseco and Amoco were not factually concerned with
unitization, both cases draw into question a duty to unitize.
181
Apart from the uncommon situation in Waseco in which secondary
or tertiary recovery does not involve unitization, one who relies
upon Waseco to require enhanced recovery will, as a practical
matter, have to address the duty to unitize. Amoco, too, will be
relied upon to address the same question. If a prudent operator
attempts unitization, the Texas courts will probably enforce the
unitization demand by the operator-lessor.
Amoco holds that an operator must protect leaseholds clearly
defined as subject to fieldwide drainage.18 2 The lessor bears the
burden of proof that drainage is substantial and that the proposed
additional operations would, more likely than not, be profitable. 18 3
A lessor can now obtain relief from an operator's refusal to seek
exceptions to the general spacing regime when it can be
demonstrated that a prudent operator would have sought such
178. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
179. Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d at 306-07. See supra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
180. Other reasons for the paucity of cases concerning secondary recovery are the sophisticated
technical assistance which a lessor must obtain, the fact that the operator is in control of most of the
critical data. and the obvious expense entailed in bringing such a lawsuit. Cf. 5 WILLIANIS & MEYERS,
supra note 4, § 861.3, at 431 (litigation rare due to the crushing burden of proof). On the other hand,
lessors over the years have also developed sophistication and the means to apply it. Perhaps the
conjunction of the three cases discussed herein in a short period of time is not coincidental.
181. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 568; Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v.
Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d at 312-13.
182. 622 S.W.2d at 568.
183. Id.
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exceptions. 18 4 Other forms of administrative relief undoubtedly will
be required under appropriate circumstances if the attention of a
court is called to the Amoco decision. Finally, the Amoco court's
enumeration of possible actions required of a prudent operator
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lends strength to the lessor who, faced with an apparently novel
situation, believes that the lessee has not acted in a manner
conducive to the interests of both.
A more difficult question arises when a lessor advocates re-
quiring exploration of wildcat acreage, either lateral acreage, new
depths, or a combination of the two. The issue of profitability is
central in this type of Amerada Hess'86 situation. Lessors will have to
be as sophisticated in their approach to this issue as a reasonable
explorationist. 87 In Amerada Hess the absence in plaintiffs' proof of
an operator ready, willing, and contractually bound to drill was
significant. 188 Perhaps more important was the ability of the
defendants to point to substantial exploratory activities undertaken
by them in the area. 89 This evidence apparently included the use of
computers and testimony regarding the price of the potential
product.1 90 Such good faith actions by the lessee indicate that the
correct result was ultimately reached.
Although just another in a long line of cases concerning further
exploration under leases held by production, Amerada Hess should
be carefully scrutinized, given the increasing importance of
exploring formations at greater depths. It was apparent to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court that the existing lessees were intent on
enhancing the recovery of yet to be discovered hydrocarbons.
Presumably the hydrocarbons were there, although the precise
location in which to commence discovery by drilling had not been
ascertained. Although the Amerada Hess opinion lacks clarity, one
can read the case to allow demands for further exploration in the
future, without penalizing the prudent operator in the exploratory
realm.
184. Id. at 570.
185. Id. at 568.
186. See Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
187. Such sophistication is shown in new leases by the increasing use of depth rights clauses,
Pugh clauses, and continuous development commitments, but that is no consolation for the many
lessors whose minerals have long been held by production. Nor is a legislative remedy likely to be of
assistance. See 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 87. l(b) (West Supp. 1981) (statutory Pugh clause).
A Pugh clause is "(tlhe name given to a type of pooling clause which provides that drilling
operations on or production from a pooled unit or units shall maintain the lease in force only as to
lands included within such unit or units." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERtS, supra note 12, at 602. See also
Kuntz, Statutory Well Spacing and Drilling Units, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 344, 349-51 (1978); Pickerill, Is
There a New Implied Covenant of Explorvelopment, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 245, 270-73
(1981).
188. 638 P.2d at 450.
189. See Pickerill, supra note 187, at 280.
190. See Pickerill, supra note 187, at 280.
ENHANCED RECOVERY
As all three of these cases indicate, we are likely to see
increasing sophistication by the lessor in requiring a lessee to carry
out activities pursuant to the oil and gas lease. The issues of
profitability and technological feasibility will undergo continued
refinement. Yet words written over thirty years ago still hold true
today:
We shall be conscious of the fact that the lessors' income
from the mineral wealth still is dependent upon the
diligence and skill with which the operations are carried
on.... We shall be mindful that the law wisely declines to
let one be the final judge of his own rights and
obligations. . . . [W]e shall expect that the implied
covenant principle will continue to have vitality in the
judicial disposition of the disputes which are bound to
arise. We shall expect that the applications of this
principle will be modified to suit the new and altered
conditions upon which it operates. We shall be prepared
to see some applications disappear entirely because the
circumstances which evoked them no longer exist. We
shall look for the development of the new law of implied
covenants in the same way in which the old law
developed, through the decision of controversies by the
courts as they are presented in concrete litigation. 191
The industry has performed well and, in the emerging context
of enhanced recovery, will continue to do so. On the occasion that
operations do not attain the level of reasonableness proved to be the
industry standard, invocation of the implied covenants will be an
important avenue of redress.
191. Merrill, Implied Covenants and Secondary Recovery, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 177, 193-94 (1951)
(footnotes omitted) (discussing unitization and implied covenants).
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